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In July 2008, the Indonesian village of Bok experienced a 
series of demonstrations that threatened to escalate into 
massive communal violence. Local religious leaders per-
sonally visited people involved in the demonstrations and 
reminded them of their religious obligations to refrain 
from violence. They used their local moral authority to 
bring warring parties to the negotiation table and keep 
them engaged. Tensions were ultimately resolved before 
violence could escalate, without the need for any formal 
police intervention (for additional details of the case, see 
Kingsley 2011). These events illustrate an often-neglected 
dimension of the role that religion can play in violent 
conflicts.
Research on violent intrastate conflict has investigated 
religion as a potentially escalating factor. Notably, quan-
titative studies have argued that specific demographic 
structures—such as religious fractionalization or polar-
ization—increase the likelihood of violence (e.g., 
Ellingsen 2000; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). 
Religion, however, is more complex than such analyses 
suggest. Focusing on religious demography alone disre-
gards essential dimensions of religion that likely affect its 
role in political violence (Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 
2014). Most notably, religions are organized through 
institutions that can influence their impact on conflicts. 
Yet we know little about how religious institutionaliza-
tion affects the role of religion in conflicts. We contribute 
to filling this gap.
Specifically, we are interested in local religious insti-
tutions, namely, places of worship—churches, mosques, 
temples—at the village level. These institutions consti-
tute a main interface between believers and their religion. 
Contrary to high-level institutions, such as religious 
umbrella organizations or high-ranking clerical bodies, 
village-level institutions are closer to the people and often 
enjoy substantial legitimacy within their respective com-
munities (Appleby 2001). Such local organizations can 
sometimes be used to incite religious violence by facili-
tating collective action (i.e., preaching religious hatred, 
organizing armed movements, and coordinating fighters; 
De Juan 2009; Toft 2007). We argue, however, that in 
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most cases, local religious institutions are an important 
resource that religious elites can draw upon to prevent an 
outbreak of violence and settle (especially nonreligious) 
conflicts peacefully. A dense layer of local religious insti-
tutions allows religious leaders to stay informed about 
various ethnic, social, or economic grievances among 
their followers and coordinate conflict resolution 
attempts. Local religious institutions can act, in the words 
of Fearon and Laitin (1996, 715), as “decentralized, non-
state institutional mechanisms” that facilitate peace.
We test this hypothesis empirically using the example 
of Indonesia. Our analysis of more than 60,000 villages 
demonstrates that village-level religious institutionaliza-
tion has a statistically significant and substantively mean-
ingful negative effect on the probability of mass fighting. 
This effect is robust to the inclusion of an exhaustive list 
of confounding variables, alternative measures of vio-
lence, and various estimation approaches.
Our findings have several important implications for 
the existing literature. First, because we substantiate an 
argument about the role of local religious institutions in 
conflict, we extend the theoretical focus of standard con-
ceptions of religion’s impact on violence. Moreover, our 
insights into the pacifying potential of religion contribute 
to broadening empirical research on its role in violence, 
which has thus far concentrated on its escalating effects. 
Second, our argument and empirical evidence also apply 
to the literature on communal violence and civil conflict 
more generally. Our focus on local, nonpolitical institu-
tions highlights a factor that has not been studied suffi-
ciently using quantitative approaches. Third, we add to 
the specific discourse on violence in Indonesia. Many 
qualitative studies have focused on the role of religion in 
Maluku and Sulawesi, highlighting its escalating effects, 
which may have led to a distorted view of the role of reli-
gion in Indonesia more generally. Contrary to some quali-
tative accounts, we are able to show that religion 
(specifically, local religious institutionalization) has 
effectively limited the outbreak of communal violence.
Communal Violence and Local 
Religious Institutions
Research on communal violence1 has emphasized the 
role of state and nonstate actors and institutions without 
actively considering the role of local religious institu-
tions. For example, Horowitz (2001) points out that com-
munal violence is closely linked to the role of government 
security forces. The reaction of the security forces—
whether they support or oppose the violence, and their 
ability to do so—influences the occurrence of communal 
violence. Relatedly, Wilkinson (2004) argues that politi-
cal elites instrumentally use communal violence to secure 
electoral support by manipulating identity groups for 
their own interests. Communal violence is thus the prod-
uct of exploiting social group boundaries for political 
benefits. In a similar vein, Brass (2003) highlights the 
importance of ethnic groups’ political mobilization in the 
context of political competition. “Riot networks” sustain 
the separation of social groups by aggravating real (or 
construed) conflicts between them in peacetime. 
Politicians can then use this persistent separation of social 
groups to escalate small conflicts into large-scale vio-
lence (Brass 2003).
Varshney (2002), by contrast, provides an explanation 
for the potentially peaceful influence of local institutions. 
He claims that institutions (i.e., trade unions or employer 
associations) crosscutting ethnic or religious group 
boundaries decrease the likelihood of communal vio-
lence. Such institutions mediate the tensions between 
identity groups, rebut stereotypes, and highlight com-
monalities. Using a comparison of six cities with and 
without Hindu/Muslim violence in India, Varshney (2001, 
378) finds that the existence of such “peace systems” can 
prevent communal violence by decreasing the potential 
benefits to politicians of aggravating intergroup tensions. 
Thus, while these studies provide for systematic analyses 
of state and nonstate institutions and religious violence, 
they do not focus on the role of features of religious com-
munities, such as levels of religious institutionalization.
The majority of the literature on civil wars and armed 
conflict treats religion as one identity marker among oth-
ers, such as ethnicity or language. The basic argument is 
that religious diversity (i.e., specific religious constella-
tions or horizontal inequalities between religious groups) 
is prone to interreligious mobilization and increases the 
risk of violence. Some statistical studies find evidence 
that religious identities can intensify large-scale violent 
conflicts (e.g., Akbaba and Taydas 2011; Basedau, 
Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2014), while others do not find over-
all robust associations with violence (e.g., Ellingsen 
2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2005). Importantly, though, quantitative studies 
on religion and organized armed conflicts generally do 
not take the institutional dimension of religion into 
account. Thus, we also know little about the role of reli-
gious institutions from this particular research strand.
Authors explicitly studying the link between religion 
and peace acknowledge the important role of religious 
institutions (e.g., Sisk 2012; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 
2011), but generally attribute little causal explanatory 
power to them. Many existing studies conceptualize insti-
tutions as faith-based actors or organizations (Appleby 
2001; Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). They 
highlight the theological norms of peace for the actions of 
religious institutions (Ter Haar 2005, 7). Therefore, the 
peace impact of religious institutions is conceptualized as 
a result of existing peace norms within the religious 
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communities (Appleby 2001, 835). Other studies argue 
that opportunity structures, rather than religious norms 
alone, affect how religious institutions act in conflicts 
(Harpviken and Røislien 2008, 364–65). They fail, how-
ever, to concretely conceptualize the relevant opportunity 
structures. Moreover—and similarly to other studies on 
the potential peace impact of religious institutions—they 
lack systematic and robust empirical analysis.
The Peace Impact of Local Religious 
Institutions
Numerous studies illustrate that religion can contribute to 
either violence or peace (e.g., Toft, Philpott, and Shah 
2011). A larger theoretical and empirical debate is still 
trying to determine the exact conditions under which reli-
gion affects violence in either direction. We add to this 
discourse by studying a new channel through which reli-
gion’s pacifying potential can be realized. More specifi-
cally, we argue that local religious institutions can provide 
effective local-level conflict resolution, preventing griev-
ances from developing into violent clashes and thereby 
reducing the risk of communal violence—in particular 
outside the narrow domain of religious grievances. The 
remainder of this section will elaborate on this 
argument.
Religion can contribute to inciting violent armed con-
flict (e.g., Akbaba and Taydas 2011; Basedau, Pfeiffer, 
and Vüllers 2014). However, discussions on the role of 
religion in violence often neglect the fact that, while reli-
gious clashes attract much attention, they actually repre-
sent a minority of conflicts around the world. Data 
provided by Svensson (2007) for 1989–2004 show that 
religious incompatibilities play a role in only around 49 
out of 168 armed conflict dyads; parties to the conflict 
belong to different faiths in only 52 out of 165 cases. This 
corresponds to numbers provided by Toft (2007): out of 
133 civil wars included in her data set, only 42 (32%) 
centered on religious issues. Finally, Basedau, Pfeiffer, 
and Vüllers (2014) present comparable figures based on a 
newly compiled data set on religious violent conflicts: 
out of a total of 138 armed conflict onsets between 1990 
and 2010, they identify only 60 cases in which the war-
ring factions differed greatly in their religious affiliation. 
More importantly, they record only 41 onsets of armed 
conflicts in which at least one warring faction had explicit 
religious aims. These data sets indicate that religion is 
sometimes associated with violence, but that religious 
violent conflicts constitute a minority of all armed 
conflicts.
To get a sense of the role of religion in more decentral-
ized forms of violence, we examine three country cases 
that are often cited for the high relevance of religion in 
their conflicts: Nigeria, Pakistan, and Indonesia.2 We rely 
on country-specific, newspaper-based violent event data 
sets to determine the share of violence that may reason-
ably be attributed to religious ideas and actors. The first 
data set was compiled by the nonprofit organization 
Nigeria Watch; it screened fifteen local newspapers and 
human rights reports from 2006 to 2012 to extract infor-
mation on 9,255 violent events in Nigeria. Only 567 of 
these events involved organized Christian or Islamic 
groups, and only 123 can directly be attributed to reli-
gious issues according to the data set. For Pakistan, we 
investigate the BFRS data set (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2013), which contains incident-level data on political 
violence from 1988 to 2011. Out of a total of 17,679 
events for which the data set provides information on the 
actors involved, religious/sectarian militants or informal 
groups, or religious parties, are mentioned as responsible 
actors in only 1,656 cases. Finally, we look at our main 
case: Indonesia. The Sistem Nasional Pemantauan 
Kekerasan Indonesia (SNPKI)3 is a government and 
World Bank financed violent event database for several 
of Indonesia’s provinces. The project provides a monthly 
updated list of violent events (conflict, domestic vio-
lence, crime, violence during law enforcement), starting 
in 1998. In this extensive data set, religion was recorded 
as a trigger of violence in only 1,361 out of a total of 
119,107 events; religious groups or actors were involved 
in only 1,285 instances of violence.
It is certainly difficult to pinpoint the exact cause or 
primary identity of the actors involved in armed conflicts 
or communal violence. Moreover, a lack of information, 
specific coding decisions, or regional foci in country-
level event data sets can lead to the underreporting of reli-
gious violence. We believe, however, that the sources 
highlighted above demonstrate that religious issues and 
identities represent just one set of potential cleavages 
among many others that may lead to violence.
While much research attempts to explain such narrow 
instances of religious violence, much less attention is 
given to another equally pertinent question: what is the 
role of religion in all other cases of violence, namely, in 
conflicts that do not seem to have any religious connota-
tion? We focus on this question. Rather than trying to 
explain the ambivalence of religion in conflicts, we 
ground our analysis on the empirical observation that 
religious escalation of violence is, in many cases, an 
exception rather than the norm. We argue that if we inves-
tigate communal violence in more general terms, instead 
of focusing on narrow cases of actual religious violence, 
we will find that religion effectively contributes to peace-
ful conflict resolution, and reduces the risk of communal 
violence.
We concentrate on a specific element of religion that 
we consider particularly relevant for communal conflicts: 
village-level religious institutions, namely, places of 
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worship such as churches, mosques, prayer houses, or 
temples. We apply a rather narrow perspective on reli-
gious institutions, and do not include organizations such 
as religious political parties or civil society actors, or 
high-level religious institutions such as national religious 
hierarchies or umbrella organizations. We focus on places 
of worship because they constitute the core of every reli-
gious community: in church services or Friday prayers, 
communities practice their beliefs. This is where reli-
gious elites, such as priests, gurus, or imams, provide reli-
gious interpretations to the believers. Contrary to 
national-level institutions, places of worship are directly 
accessible to the local communities and thus provide an 
essential interface between the believers and their orga-
nized religion. Wider religious activities, such as choirs, 
prayer groups, or social welfare activities (e.g., soup 
kitchens, education, or family services), are often directly 
linked to local churches, mosques, or other local places of 
worship. These strong ties are likely to be weaker beyond 
the congregational level, highlighting the importance of 
local institutions (Wald, Silverman, and Fridy 2005).
Our main hypothesis is that a high density of local reli-
gious institutions decreases the likelihood of communal 
violence. The two main mechanisms operate via strength-
ening horizontal and vertical contacts within religious 
communities.
Religions have specific features that make them par-
ticularly well suited to fostering strong horizontal net-
works (Pickering 2006). Religion is, in many cases, not 
based on self-selection as people are born into their 
respective religious communities. It, therefore, tends to 
create more heterogeneous communities (Ammerman 
2003). Moreover, religious ceremonies involve the 
repeated interaction of individuals from various socio-
economic backgrounds. Finally, religion engenders 
norms that foster intrareligious cooperation among such 
different groups (Ammerman 2003). We argue that a high 
level of institutionalization contributes to fomenting 
these elements. Local religious institutions are encultur-
ated—they are often deeply rooted in their own commu-
nities, representing a complex web of relationships 
cutting across economic, political, and ethnic divisions. 
Moreover, they provide venues for regular face-to-face 
interaction and contribute to forging intrareligious con-
tact and cooperation through regular and shared religious 
rituals.
This reasoning is related to the concept of social capi-
tal (Putnam 2000, 65–79) and a prominent argument put 
forward by Ashutosh Varshney, as discussed above. 
Putnam (2000, 66) argues that “churches [understood as 
religious institutions of whatever faith] provide an impor-
tant incubator for civic skills, civic norms, community 
interests, and civic recruitment.” All of these features of 
religious institutions, thus, are relevant for social capital 
that helps to solve communal problems because of the 
preexisting networks and relationships. Horizontal net-
works of religious communities, therefore, are one facet 
of social capital. According to Varshney (2001), hetero-
geneous, interreligious civic organizations helped to 
build networks across religious communities in India and 
thereby contributed to dampening violent interreligious 
conflicts. In a similar vein, we argue that religious institu-
tions can create bonds across economic, political, and 
sometimes even ethnic divisions and thereby reduce the 
risk of communal conflict across these nonreligious 
cleavages. Dense religious institutions allow frequent 
contact between members. This aids the flow of informa-
tion, the emergence of meaningful reputations, and the 
sanctioning of out-of-norm behavior through peer social 
pressure (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Independent of the 
ethnic demographics within and across villages, dense 
religious institutions can act as an integrative force that 
bridges potential gaps even between fairly polarized 
identity and socioeconomic groups.4 If most conflict-rel-
evant cleavages are nonreligious, as argued above, dense 
religious institutions should be associated with lower lev-
els of communal violence.
In Nepal, for example, local religious actors and insti-
tutions have traditionally played an important role in 
intracommunity mediation and informal conflict resolu-
tion. This holds true for Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist 
communities alike. The specific pacifying potential of 
religious institutions rests on horizontal networks based 
on integrating religious beliefs, symbols, and activities 
that transcend nonreligious cleavages. Resolution of eth-
nic, resource-based or economic conflict is made binding 
through religious oaths in the name of the common God 
and touching of common sacred books or symbols. 
Festivals, discussions of classical religious texts, and per-
forming religious rites provide occasions for religion-
based interaction and reconciliation across nonreligious 
divides (Dahal and Bhatta 2008).
The second mechanism operates through strengthen-
ing vertical networks between religious leaders and 
believers. Religious elites often enjoy a moral credibility 
that is unmatched by other local actors (Powers 2010, 
331), and local institutions give such elites direct access 
to believers (Traunmüller and Freitag 2011) and 
strengthen their capability to monitor, mediate, and police 
communal conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Priests, 
imams, gurus, or religious teachers meet their constitu-
ents in daily services, Friday prayers, or prayer groups, 
which provides the means to publicly condemn violence 
and call for peace and restraint (Wald, Silverman, and 
Fridy 2005). Furthermore, close relations between reli-
gious elites and local believers can serve as an early 
warning system for social tensions. Believers will inform 
religious leaders about perceived injustices or growing 
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conflicts through local institutions. Therefore, religious 
elites know very early about growing tensions and can act 
to prevent the same. Assuming, in line with Fearon and 
Laitin (1996), that religious communities and leaders 
generally prefer peace over war, these institutional ties 
support local religious elites’ monitoring, mediation, and 
policing activities.
In Sri Lanka, for example, religious committees and 
leaders, such as mosque committees, the church, parish 
councils, and their subsidiary bodies, have been particu-
larly active in solving disputes within their communities. 
They focus on land disputes, interethnic conflicts, or 
youth violence. They use their local influence and direct 
contact to the believers to identify emerging conflicts and 
engage parties in peaceful conflict resolution. Religious 
leaders provide guidance during sermons; often com-
plaints are addressed during or after common prayers. 
Local religious committees investigate issues that have 
been raised, summon or visit the parties to the dispute, 
issue warnings, mediate, or arbitrate (Centre for Policy 
Alternatives 2003).
Thus, vertical ties support the conflict-mitigating role 
of the aforementioned horizontal networks in that they 
provide additional capacities for the identification and 
effective mediation of tensions across various socioeco-
nomic cleavages—provided that religious elites do not 
face explicit incentives to foment violence.5
Communal Conflicts in Indonesia
According to the Indonesian Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, approximately 88 percent of the Indonesian pop-
ulation self-identify as Muslim, 9.3 percent as Christian, 
1.8 percent as Hindu, and 0.6 percent as Buddhist (Human 
Rights Watch 2013). There are also an undetermined 
number of other customary and indigenous religions that 
the state has been encouraging to join one of the major 
faiths (Schiller 1996).
While there were cases of interreligious and commu-
nal violence before the end of the 1990s (Kim 1998; Van 
Klinken 2001), the number of clashes between various 
identity groups increased substantially after the fall of the 
Suharto regime (Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean 
2008). The most prominent interreligious clashes have 
been violent conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi. Fighting 
on Maluku began in 1999, pitting Christian Ambonese 
against Muslims from Sulawesi. The religious dimension 
of the conflict was apparent from the start: churches and 
mosques were targeted and burned down, and there were 
reports of forced conversions and massacres exclusively 
targeting Muslims and Christians (International Crisis 
Group [ICG] 2000, 2002; Turner 2003). The violence in 
Sulawesi, especially in the city of Poso, displayed similar 
patterns: religious narratives of violence were preached 
to people within houses of worship (Van Klinken 2007). 
Churches and mosques served as military headquarters 
and communication nodes for coordinating the fighters 
(ICG 2002).
Whereas such interreligious conflicts have been par-
ticularly intense and have received much media and 
scholarly attention, they have by no means been the only 
incidences of violence in Indonesia. As argued above, 
other forms of conflict may have been less severe but all 
the more frequent. What we briefly demonstrated above, 
using the SNPKI data, is also confirmed by another data 
set collated by Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean 
(2008). Their data contain information on violent con-
flicts in fourteen of Indonesia’s twenty-eight provinces 
for the period 1990–2003. According to their data, ethno-
communal (including interreligious) conflicts have 
accounted for nearly 90 percent of total fatalities but only 
17 percent of the incidences. Taken together, other types 
of collective violence—including economic conflicts, 
conflicts between the state and communities, intervillage 
brawls and vigilante killings—have been much more fre-
quent. This is particularly true for provinces other than 
Maluku and Sulawesi. Java, for example, accounted for 
the highest number of incidents of collective violence. 
However, only around 2 percent of these conflicts have 
been ethnocommunal in nature. These data show us that 
interreligious conflicts in Indonesia have been rather rare 
events compared with other forms of collective violence. 
Furthermore, even in the high period of communal vio-
lence in Indonesia, the vast majority of communities did 
not experience any form of organized violence. Whereas 
religion has clearly contributed to violence in Maluku 
and Poso, focusing on these specific conflicts may distort 
our understanding of the role of religious institutions in 
violent conflict overall.
The existing literature on communal violence in 
Indonesia has put forward several arguments to explain 
the patterns of violence. Bertrand (2004) argues that the 
fall of Suharto marked the start of a period in which 
Indonesia’s “National Model” was renegotiated, which 
redefined the balance between various identity groups 
and led to various forms of violence. Braithwaite et al. 
(2010) argue that Indonesia experienced a period of ano-
mie in which security forces failed to stay neutral, which 
contributed to the spread of violence. Similarly, Wilson 
(2008) asserts that the security forces’ failure to limit 
communal violence contributed to the overall escalation 
of violence. Some trace local violence directly to the 
meddling of Jakarta elites (ICG 2000; Turner 2003), but 
Bertrand (2004, 6) and work by Van Klinken and others 
deemphasize the role of centrally guided security forces 
in communal violence and highlight the importance of 
local competition for resources in triggering violent 
clashes (Van Klinken 2007). An important recent study 
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by Tajima (2013) argues that neither of these explana-
tions can fully account for the spatial and temporal pat-
terns of communal violence. He argues that localities that 
depended heavily on state security institutions experi-
enced more violence in the aftermath of authoritarian 
breakdown, as compared with communities that could 
rely on informal, nonstate security institutions to manage 
local conflict.
While these studies offer insights into the causes and 
timing of communal violence in Indonesia’s posttransi-
tion period, we aim at understanding the role of local reli-
gious institutions in these conflicts. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that religious institutions have, in many cases, 
been involved in conflict resolution. They have report-
edly played a significant role in de-escalating large-scale 
conflicts such as ethnic violence between Dayaks and 
Immigrant Madurese in Kalimatan (ICG 2001), during 
anti-U.S. protests in Jakarta (Schröter 2003), in phases of 
instability in Lombok (Kingsley 2011), and in the auton-
omy conflict in West Papua (Rutherford 2006).
We believe that they can be successful in preventing 
and peacefully resolving local-level disputes, which 
form the bulk of the conflicts in Indonesia (e.g., intra- 
and intervillage brawls, conflicts over land issues, vigi-
lante activities). Reports prepared by the World Bank 
show that in Indonesia, religious leaders play a signifi-
cant role in local-level conflict resolution. In many 
regions, they have substantial bargaining power within 
their local communities that enables them to bring con-
flicting parties together and mediate effectively. The 
individual authority and legitimacy of religious institu-
tions allows them to intervene in conflicts and effec-
tively prevent escalation into mass fighting (World Bank 
2004, 2008).
Over the years, the growing influence of religious 
institutions compared with local state institutions and tra-
ditional authorities has increased their role in Indonesian 
village-level governance (Duncan 2009). Religious affili-
ation and networks have long played an important role in 
careers in business and politics, which increases the 
social leverage of religious institutions. For various rea-
sons, traditional institutions in Indonesia (adat), that is, 
customary laws that govern interpersonal relations and 
can be used to regulate conflicts, have lost their influence 
over the population (Acciaioli 2001). Thus, in many 
areas, people’s focus was shifting from traditional to reli-
gious norms and institutions: mosques and churches 
became more important than adat (Duncan 2009). 
Religious institutions’ substantial and growing influence 
over their constituencies—compared with alternative 
local-level institutions—has enabled them to effectively 




We now turn to a more systematic treatment of our argu-
ment. To substantiate our claim that the density of local 
religious institutions has pacifying effects on communal 
violence, we utilize data on Indonesian villages from the 
peak of communal violence in the early 2000s. Other sta-
tistical analyses of communal violence in Indonesia have 
focused on a comprehensive explanation of the violence 
(Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan 2009), and have noted, 
among other factors, the potential relevance of local reli-
gious institutions. Our analysis is distinct in that our theo-
retical argument and empirical investigation explicitly 
focus on the effect of local religious institutions and trace 
the mechanism in more detail.
We use the Indonesian village (desa), the lowest 
administrative level, as our unit of analysis. We draw on 
the 2003 Indonesian village-level census (Pendataan 
Potensi Desa [PODES]) for the majority of our covariate 
information. The village census is conducted regularly by 
Indonesia’s statistical agency (Badan Pusat Statistik 
[BPS]) and covers a number of issue areas, ranging from 
basic infrastructural information and economic activities 
to religious institutions and political affairs.6 The village 
census is implemented by enumerators from local BPS 
branches in collaboration with local village heads. The 
2003 iteration of the PODES covered more than 67,000 
villages and, for the first time, also contained questions 
on communal violence. This rich source of information 
allows us to trace the effect of local religious institutions 
on communal violence, while controlling for a number of 
important alternative factors that have contributed to the 
outbreak of communal violence in Indonesia. More 
importantly, it allows us to effectively compare villages 
in regions that have been identified in the literature as 
hotspots of communal violence (e.g., Ambon and Poso) 
with those in regions that escaped widespread mass 
fighting.
To measure communal violence, we create a simple 
dummy indicator for each village that takes a value of 1 if 
any incidents of mass fighting were reported for the pre-
vious year in the PODES 2003 survey, and 0 otherwise.7 
This variable includes all forms of violent incidents, 
ranging from religious or ethnic violence to riots and 
mass brawls. Based on this indicator, only about 7 per-
cent of all villages experienced communal violence 
across the archipelago in the early 2000s. In additional 
analyses, we further distinguish between different types 
of violence. The PODES offers additional subcategories: 
communal fighting, ethnic fighting, and clashes with 
state security forces. While this classification is not 
related to any theoretical conceptualization from the 
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literature on communal violence, it offers us some limited 
opportunities to assess the effect of religious institutions 
on more specific forms of violence. We create additional 
dummy variables to capture each category individually.
To test whether local religious institutions have a paci-
fying effect on communal violence, we rely on informa-
tion about the number of places of worship in each 
village. The village census records this information for all 
major religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism). For our main analysis, we 
simply calculate the total number of places of worship 
and normalize by local population size. We log our mea-
sure, as we expect diminishing returns in the pacifying 
effect of religious institutionalization. While the number 
of places of worship per capita is not a perfect measure of 
local religious institutions, we believe it is a good proxy 
for the general capabilities of local religious elites to 
leverage horizontal and vertical networks for peaceful 
conflict resolution (see robustness checks for alternative 
specifications).
We control for a large set of confounding variables. 
We draw on the wealth of information in the PODES, as 
well as additional information on ethnic and religious 
compositions and the socioeconomic inequality of the 
village population from the population census.8 We con-
sider structural factors such as the (logged) population 
size (PODES), the (logged) distance to the district capital 
(PODES), (logged) population density (PODES), and 
whether the village was located in an urban area (PODES), 
as the wider conflict literature has identified these as rel-
evant factors (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). We also 
include several socioeconomic measures to cover local 
grievances: local unemployment (PODES), presence of 
natural resources (PODES), the poverty rate (Tajima 
2013), interpersonal inequality based on educational 
attainment (Tajima 2013), and the degree of inequality 
between ethnic and religious groups, also measured via 
educational attainment (Tajima 2013). Furthermore, we 
control for the political influence of the former ruling 
party Golkar and the former major opposition party 
Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P) at the 
local level via binary variables that indicate whether 
either party received the most votes in the village during 
the last legislative elections (PODES), in case political 
dynamics influence the relationship between religious 
institutionalization and communal violence.9 Tajima 
(2013) provides strong evidence that a prior reliance on 
state security institutions played an important role for 
communal violence after the authoritarian breakdown. 
We use his measure of the distance to the nearest police 
post to capture how strongly villages depended on formal 
security institutions to regulate conflict. We include this 
variable to distinguish the potential effects of local reli-
gious institutions from his argument.
As we focus on the effects of religious institutions 
rather than the religiosity or religious composition of the 
population itself, we control for the level of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization of the village population, mea-
sured via standard Herfindahl fractionalization indices 
(Tajima 2013).10 The expectation is generally that locali-
ties with higher levels of ethnic or religious fractionaliza-
tion are more likely to host groups with intergroup 
grievances and are thus more likely to experience vio-
lence. To single out the potential benefits of religious 
institutions, we also construct a measure of local religious 
institutional fractionalization11 and polarization, based on 
the number of different types of houses of worship.12 
Polarization, as opposed to fractionalization, measures 
the degree to which the distribution of religious institu-
tions resembles two equally sized groups. Extreme polar-
ization is thought to increase violence, because collective 
action is more likely for two equally sized, antagonistic 
groups (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Summary 
statistics for all variables are shown in the supplementary 
online appendix (http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/).
For our main analysis, we estimate a standard logit 
model with standard errors clustered at the district level. 
We also estimate conditional logit models that include 
fixed effects at the district level and remove any remain-
ing unobserved factors shared across villages within the 
same district.
Main Results
We now turn to our main results. Table 1 presents the esti-
mated coefficients and standard errors for our main logit 
and conditional logit models, using the mass fighting and 
subtype indicators as our dependent variables.
The first two columns show clear support for our main 
hypothesis: villages with higher levels of religious insti-
tutionalization have a lower probability of having experi-
enced a mass fighting incident. The coefficient is 
statistically significant below the 0.1 and 5 percent levels 
in the logit and conditional logit models, respectively. 
This effect is obtained in the presence of a number of 
important confounding factors. Of the control variables, 
we find similar results as prior studies; the strongest 
results are for the unemployment rate and the distance to 
the nearest police post. It is important to point out that the 
conditional logit models control for unobserved factors at 
the district level that might affect the level of local reli-
gious institutions and communal violence.
The other columns display results for the different 
forms of communal violence classified by the PODES 
census. For communal fighting, we again find negative 
and highly statistically significant results for both the 
logit and conditional logit models. For clashes between 
ethnic groups and with security forces, we still find a 
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negative effect in the logit estimations, but the coefficient 
for religious institutionalization loses statistical signifi-
cance in the conditional logit models. The somewhat 
weaker findings for the conditional logit models are 
likely due to the much smaller number of cases, as dis-
tricts with no violence are automatically dropped from 
the analysis, or because ethnicity correlates more strongly 
with religion than other cleavages.
Our results indicate that religious institutions are a sta-
tistically relevant factor in explaining variation in com-
munal violence across Indonesian villages, but we have 
not yet shown the substantive importance. Figure 1 plots 
Table 1. The Effect of Religious Institutionalization on Mass Fighting.
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Religious inequality −0.196 −0.467 −0.605 −0.394 1.559 0.299 −0.719 −0.849
(0.678) (0.457) (0.598) (0.534) (1.399) (1.419) (1.943) (2.03)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.507* 0.216 −0.13 −0.0268 2.410*** 1.022 1.097* 0.562
(0.219) (0.143) (0.215) (0.179) (0.54) (0.622) (0.455) (0.5)
Religious 
fractionalization
−0.895* −0.235 −0.0972 −0.108 0.106 0.488 −2.305* −0.35
(0.383) (0.249) (0.345) (0.297) (1.022) (0.891) (1.068) (1.017)
Log(Population) −0.00832 0.553*** 0.283*** 0.546*** 0.317 0.750*** −0.122 0.713***
(0.135) (0.0394) (0.0632) (0.0483) (0.213) (0.175) (0.2) (0.134)
Log(Distance district 
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−0.0118 −0.0676** 0.0691 −0.0356 0.0479 −0.136 −0.0427 0.0856
(0.0757) (0.0239) (0.0522) (0.0302) (0.123) (0.0903) (0.162) (0.0889)
Unemployment 1.676*** 1.368*** 1.311** 1.202*** 3.293*** 3.234** 2.492** 2.184*
(0.445) (0.292) (0.416) (0.353) (0.847) (1.1) (0.836) (0.974)
Distance police −0.00628* −0.00785*** −0.00984† −0.0132*** 0.00495 0.00624 0.00895 0.00811†
(0.00313) (0.00195) (0.00564) (0.00281) (0.00678) (0.00632) (0.0067) (0.00468)
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−0.381 −0.403 −0.235 −0.477 0.328 −0.64 1.23 1.756
(0.367) (0.337) (0.385) (0.407) (1.269) (1.166) (1.386) (1.475)
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1.344* 0.619 0.779 0.531 0.485 0.619 −0.696 −2.472
(0.669) (0.601) (0.691) (0.726) (2.27) (2.036) (2.536) (2.75)
Log(Religious 
institutional density)
−0.518*** −0.101* −0.397*** −0.0942† −0.645** 0.104 −0.600*** −0.0389
(0.0804) (0.04) (0.0562) (0.0487) (0.207) (0.192) (0.168) (0.146)
Constant −5.421*** −8.504*** −13.42*** −6.723***  
(1.237) (0.582) (1.31) (1.911)  
Observations 53,466 51,322 53,466 48,958 53,466 12,914 53,466 21,186
AIC 23,947.4 19,314.2 16,820 13,872.2 1,574.2 992.4 2,568.2 1,708.2
BIC 24,116.3 19,473.5 16,988.9 14,030.5 1,743 1,126.8 2,737 1,851.5
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. AIC = Akaike information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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the simulated effect of the density of religious institutions 
on the probability of a mass fighting incident and the 
associated 95 percent confidence interval.13
The graph shows the substantive importance of reli-
gious institutions for peace. Moving from the sample 
minimum to the maximum, the probability of violence 
drops from approximately 30 to 1–2 percent. Importantly, 
we obtain this effect while controlling for a number of 
existing alternative explanations. This fairly large effect 
implies an important new insight for understanding com-
munal violence in Indonesia and the role of religious 
institutions in violence more generally: religious institu-
tionalization reduces communal violence.
Robustness Checks
We implement a number of robustness checks to analyze 
the sensitivity of our main findings. For example, as an 
alternative to standard logit, we also estimate rare-events 
logistic models (King and Zeng 2001) without affecting 
our main finding (see Section 2 of the supplementary 
online appendix).14 We also add additional observable 
covariates that might operate as omitted variables. We 
include variables that capture the presence of customary 
adat institutions, the existence of a village representative 
board, and a neighborhood association. Including any of 
these variables has no effect on our findings about reli-
gious institutions (see Section 3 of the supplementary 
online appendix). Furthermore, we estimate logit and 
conditional logit models with fixed effects at the subdis-
trict level (see Section 5 of the supplementary online 
appendix). Moving from fixed effects at the district to the 
subdistrict level controls for any unobservable character-
istics shared between villages in the same neighborhood. 
Across both models, we still find that religious institu-
tionalization has a statistically significant and negative 
effect on communal violence.
We also substitute our main measure with the logged 
number of religious schools, as an alternative approach. 
This variable equally shows the pacifying effects of reli-
gious institutions on communal violence (see Section 4 of 
the supplementary online appendix). Next, we disaggre-
gate different religious traditions, calculating the reli-
gious institutionalization measure for each of the major 
religions separately. We still find a consistently negative 
and statistically significant effect of religious institutions 
across religious traditions. The effect is most pronounced 
for Islamic places of worship, but this is simply because 
Islam is the dominant religion in Indonesia and has the 
most houses of worship (see Section 9 of the supplemen-
tary online appendix).
There might also be a problem of reverse causality, as 
in many ethnoreligious clashes in Indonesia, places of 
worship were targets of violence and were destroyed. If 
higher levels of violence reduce the number of places of 
worship, the negative relationship in our results might be 
due to reverse causality. We explore three different strate-
gies to address any remaining endogeneity concerns.
First, we add information on the number of places of 
worship from the 2000 PODES, which took place before 
the large spike in communal violence in the early 2000s.15 
We reestimate our three main models using the level of 
religious institutionalization pre-2000 and can strongly 
confirm our initial findings.
Second, we exploit information on local forms of vio-
lence from a different data source. The SNPKI provides 
location identifiers down to the subdistrict level and 
allows us to calculate the total number of local violent 





















Figure 1. Probability of mass fighting as a function of religious institutional density.
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events for different time periods. While not as geographi-
cally disaggregated as our village-level data, these data 
give us the opportunity to utilize a different measurement 
of local violence and more directly exploit overtime vari-
ation. Because our PODES data provide information on 
religious institutionalization from 1999 and 2002, we cal-
culate the total number of violent events in a subdistrict 
for 2000–2003 and 2003–2005. Moreover, these data also 
allow us to measure levels of violence in the pre-2000 
period. We aggregate our local religious institutionaliza-
tion measure to the subdistrict level and match it to the 
observations included in the sample of the SNPKI data-
base. The SNPKI database only covers thirteen of 
Indonesia’s thirty-three provinces, with varying time cov-
erage. Hence, the number of observations is drastically 
smaller than our village-level data set. We estimate mod-
els with district fixed effects and the logged number of 
total events as a dependent variable. The district fixed 
effects control for a number of confounding factors, and 
we also include the level of pre-2000 violence for each 
subdistrict. Again, we can confirm the pacifying effects 
of religious institutionalization (see Section 6 of the sup-
plementary online appendix).
Finally, in the supplementary online appendix, we 
explore an instrumental variable strategy that exploits 
geographic determinants of the spread of religion across 
the Indonesian archipelago. Using 2-Stages-Least-
Squares IV regressions, we also find that religious institu-
tionalization has a clear negative and statistically 
significant effect, although we cannot be certain that our 
set of instruments fulfills the exclusion restriction (see 
Section 7 of the supplementary online appendix).
Testing Additional Theoretical Implications
We also briefly test several other observable implications 
of our theoretical argument: the role of norms, various 
interaction models, and effects on conflict resolution. The 
objective of these additional analyses is to lend further 
support to our argument that the correlations reported 
above can be plausibly attributed to religious institution-
alization and the resulting horizontal and vertical net-
works within religious communities.
An alternative explanation for our finding might be 
that institutionalized religions can act as capable partners 
of the state. Lower levels of violence might be caused by 
religious elites collaborating with the security sector to 
enforce nonviolence norms. To test for this possibility, we 
interact our main variable with the distance to the district 
capital and the nearest police post, as presumably any 
collaboration between religious institutions and the state 
is facilitated by geographic proximity. We find no evi-
dence to that effect.
We also investigate a number of interactions to see if 
the results are consistent with our proposed mechanism. 
We start by interacting our institutional density measure 
with variables capturing village size (e.g., population 
counts and area). If the mechanism relates to facilitating 
within-religion access, then the effect should be larger in 
smaller villages. This is exactly what we find. The inter-
action with population size is positive (i.e., it weakens the 
pacifying effect) in both the logit and fixed-effects logit 
models, reaching statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level in the latter. The interaction term with area also has 
the correct sign but just misses statistical significance at 
the 10 percent level. We also interact our measure with 
the demographic ethnic and religious fractionalization 
scores, as well as institutional fractionalization and polar-
ization. Because we argue that religious institutionaliza-
tion should have a pacifying effect that is independent of 
demographic constellations, we would expect to find no 
strong interactions across village types. Again, this is 
exactly what we find.16
The SNPKI data also allow us to identify whether reli-
gious actors were involved in any violent event. Only 
using events with religious actor participation as the 
dependent variable reveals that religious institutionaliza-
tion in this case has no significant effect and even has a 
negative sign. This supports the idea that religious institu-
tions can (and often do) mitigate various conflicts but not 
necessarily conflicts that are already religiously charged.
To further investigate whether our findings are in line 
with our theoretical argument, we use other survey items 
from the PODES. For more than 4,000 villages that expe-
rienced violent clashes, the census also asks whether the 
conflict was eventually resolved peacefully and by what 
type of actor. Table 2 shows estimates of a logit model 
that uses the same control variables and our religious 
institutionalization measure.
We find that for villages that experienced conflict, the 
ones with higher levels of religious institutionalization 
were more likely to solve their conflict peacefully (statis-
tically significant below the 5% level, Column 1) and to 
do so via village-level institutions (statistically signifi-
cant below the 5% level) rather than through the security 
apparatus (Column 2). This offers another important 
layer of evidence for our overall finding that (1) religious 
institutionalization (of any major religion) has played a 
major role in limiting communal violence in Indonesia, 
and (2) religious institutionalization has supported peace-
ful conflict resolution in villages that have experienced 
conflict.
We also estimate the effect of religious institutional-
ization on other out-of-norm behavior that underlies simi-
lar sanctions through religious teachings. In particular, 
we exploit information from the PODES census on the 
presence of prostitution, rape, and drug usage in the vil-
lage. Overall, we find mixed results. While the effect of 
religious institutionalization is negative for drug usage, 
the coefficient is not significant for rape and positive for 
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prostitution (see Section 8 of the supplementary online 
appendix). We believe the absence of a consistent nega-
tive effect might be due to weaker norms (and enforce-
ment) with respect to out-of-norm behavior below the 
threshold of communal violence or measurement bias in 
the survey—the village census is likely to underreport 
such activities in comparison with more large-scale 
incidents.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our research is a first step toward understanding the insti-
tutional dimension of religion in communal violence. Our 
findings challenge the existing conceptualization of “reli-
gion” as a mere identity marker or theological idea in 
quantitative studies. Furthermore, our results call into 
question the dominant explanation in the literature of reli-
gion and peace. Some argue that every religion is gener-
ally peaceful, and that any nonviolent action by religious 
actors is a result of nonviolence norms. We find no empir-
ical evidence of such an explanation and instead show 
that the level of religious institutionalization explains the 
impact of religious actors’ peace efforts.
While we have examined the impact of local religious 
institutions in the context of Indonesia, there is reason to 
believe that similar mechanisms are relevant in other 
countries. First, as noted in section “The Peace Impact of 
Local Religious Institutions,” religion and religious 
actors do not constitute the main loci of large- and small-
scale conflicts. Hence, the pacifying effects of religious 
institutionalization are likely to be relevant in a large set 
of contexts of violence. Second, while our empirical 
study only analyzes Indonesia, the country’s enormous 
size and diversity strengthens the external validity of our 
findings. Studies from other contexts such as Nepal and 
Sri Lanka (section “The Peace Impact of Local Religious 
Institutions”) provide auxiliary support for our findings. 
In a comparative study of religious institutions in Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire, MacLean (2004) shows that local reli-
gious institutions in Ghana had a more strongly pacifying 
impact on communities, as compared with the Côte 
d’Ivoire. Members of local religious institutions in Ghana 
met regularly in subgroups, such as choirs or women 
organizations. These regular contacts between different 
families, classes, and genders established strong social 
linkages within the same local religious community and 
“made local politics, including political party organiza-
tion, more active, salient, and openly heterogeneous” 
(MacLean 2004, 605). The importance of the local com-
munity and the leading role of the local religious institu-
tions, as MacLean argues, is one reason explaining why 
possible ethnic conflicts in Ghana were often prevented 
at an early stage.
While these examples support the relevance of our 
finding beyond the Indonesian context, it is equally 
important to acknowledge possible limitations. 
Indonesia’s ethnic and religious landscape, overall frac-
tionalized but often locally relatively homogeneous, 
might allow for different effects of religious institutional-
ization as compared with a decidedly polarized context 
with overlapping and reenforcing cleavages.
We conclude by discussing some limitations of our 
argument. An influential literature on communal violence 
deals with the potential conflict-escalating role of religious 
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elites. Two prominent cases of interreligious violence in 
Indonesia, Maluku and Sulawesi, also illustrate that reli-
gious institutions sometimes fail to mediate (or even con-
tribute to) communal violence. We believe this to be the 
case for two reasons. First, the peace impact of religious 
institutions possibly declines once a manifest interreligious 
conflict begins. This is also supported by our additional 
robustness checks that show that the pacifying effect of 
religious institutions is absent for conflicts in which reli-
gious actors were involved. The interreligious conflict in 
both provinces has lasted for several years and has been 
integrated into the belief systems of the various religious 
groups. This has resulted in harsh in-/out-group differences 
between local religious groups. Moreover, effective polic-
ing by local religious institutions was inhibited by the 
social distance between the religious groups and the below-
average levels of religious institutionalization. It would, 
therefore, be interesting to look more closely at the degree 
and role of religious institutionalization in Maluku and 
Sulawesi before the outbreak of violence to understand the 
historical evolution leading up to the conflicts.
Second, some of the main violent actors did not come 
from the local villages in Maluku and Sulawesi. Religious 
institutions are likely limited in their ability to substantively 
influence outsiders, who—similar to recent migrants—are 
not as heavily integrated into the local religious institutions 
and are therefore less likely to be affected by horizontal and 
vertical linkages. Future analyses should further examine 
the interplay of outsiders and local religious institutions, 
and more generally, under which conditions religious elites 
get drawn into an escalating role for conflict.
Finally, while this paper focuses on the role of religious 
institutionalization, it is worth asking whether the same 
pacifying effect can be generated by other, nonreligious 
institutions with similar characteristics. We believe this to 
be an important future test of our argument. If other non-
state institutions that strengthen horizontal and vertical 
contacts among members exert a pacifying effect on con-
flicts, this would provide further evidence for institutional 
rather than norm-specific mechanisms. Such institutions 
would need to be sufficiently inclusive to act as an integra-
tive force for a variety of conflict issues (e.g., water or 
school committees would be too narrowly defined) while 
being sufficiently salient in communities’ daily life to 
ensure strong-enough horizontal and vertical ties. From 
such a perspective, traditional ethnic and tribal institutions 
as well as local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
may constitute promising subjects of further studies along 
the lines of the one presented in this paper.
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Notes
 1. We define all forms of nonstate violent incidents (i.e., reli-
gious or ethnic violence, riots, mass brawls) as “commu-
nal violence.” This is the most practical approach due to 
our main theoretical argument and dependent variable (see 
below). According to this definition, ethnic violence is a 
subcategory of “communal violence.”
 2. The cases of Nigeria and Pakistan are only used for descrip-
tive purposes; our main analysis focuses on Indonesia.
 3. http://www.snpk-indonesia.com/.
 4. As long as ethnic and religious identity do not perfectly 
correlate.
 5. A higher degree of religious institutionalization might also 
increase competition between religious institutions, which 
might in turn lead to violence between religious groups. 
This would counteract the pacifying effects of religious 
institutionalization. We test for this possibility in our 
robustness checks by disaggregating religious institution-
alization by denomination.
 6. The questionnaire is fielded by enumerators of the statisti-
cal office at the subdistrict level and relies on information 
from the village head.
 7. The Pendataan Potensi Desa (PODES) questionnaire does 
not provide information on the number of incidents in each 
village.
 8. Tajima (2013) implements a very insightful analysis 
of communal violence in Indonesia that also draws on 
PODES data. He also provides important information on 
population characteristics from the population census. We 
use his replication data and match this information to our 
data set. As the two data sets lack a common village-level 
identifier, we use information on the district ID, subdistrict 
ID, population size, altitude, and distance to the nearest 
police post to match villages.
 9. No major legislative elections took place during the 
PODES survey. The last national legislative elections, as 
well as elections to district-level representative bodies, 
took place in 1999. Some villages may have had elections 
for village head positions, but we are unable to identify 
those in our data.
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10. The fractionalization index is defined as 1 2−∑ si  where 
si
2  is the population share of group i.
11. Again, calculated as a Herfindahl fractionalization index. 
Here, instead of using the population share for each reli-




12. The polarization measure draws on work by Esteban and 
Ray (1994). Polarization is defined as 4 12s si i( ).−∑
13. For the simulation, all control variables were set to 
their respective means, medians, or modes. We used 
the CLARIFY routine in STATA to obtain our estimates 
(Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).
14. Note that “rare” in the context of maximum likelihood 
logit estimation refers to the absolute counts of each out-
come type. As in our sample 4,821 villages out of more 
than 60,000 experienced a mass fighting incident, violence 
is somewhat rare in relative terms, but this is not problem-
atic for a logit model.
15. Combining information across different waves of the 
PODES is not straightforward, as the number of villages, 
subdistricts, and districts changes. Matching on ID codes 
produces about 75 percent correct matches. Our results 
are substantively identical when we use the whole sample 
(with some mismatched villages) and when we use cor-
rectly matched villages.
16. While the interaction with ethnic fractionalization in the 
village is positive and significant, simulations reveal that 
any difference is substantively meaningless. For example, 
the effect of increasing religious institutionalization from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile at low and high levels of eth-
nic fractionalization is a reduction in probability of 0.026 
and 0.0256 percentage points, respectively.
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